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TWO-TIERED TEST FOR DOUBLE JEOPARDY
ANALYSIS IN NEW MEXICO

Protection against double jeopardy is secured by the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides that no one
shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb."' The double jeopardy clause is enforceable against
states through the fourteenth amendment,2 and a similar clause is
embodied in the New Mexico Constitution.3 The United States
Supreme Court has defined the policy underlying double jeopardy
protection as the protection of an individual from repeated attempts
to convict him-attempts which would compel him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity. 4

THE CASE
With its decision in State v. Tanton (Tanton II),I the New Mexico
Supreme Court established a two-tiered test designed to meet the
policy underlying the double jeopardy clauses of both the United
States and New Mexico Constitutions. The issue involved in Tanton
was whether the defendant was being subjected to double jeopardy.
Tanton had hit and killed a small child with his car. On the day of
the accident, he was charged in municipal court with violation of
municipal traffic ordinances. 6 Several days later, in district court,
Tanton was charged by criminal indictment with homicide by
1. U.S. Const. amend. V.
2. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
3. N.M. Const. art. 2, § 15. The section provides, "nor shall any person be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense .. "
4. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
5. 88 N.M. 333, 540 P.2d 813 (1975).
6. The following day a criminal complaint charging Tanton with vehicular homicide was
filed in magistrate court, but no further action was taken on that particular charge. Id. at
334, 540 P.2d at 814.
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vehicle 7 while driving recklessly, 8 or alternatively, homicide by
vehicle while driving under the influence of alcohol. 9
Tanton was subsequently convicted in municipal court of violation
of several municipal ordinances, including driving under the influence
of intoxicating liquors, failing to report an accident and leaving the
scene of an accident involving injuries or death.1 0 After the municipal court verdict was rendered, the defendant moved to dismiss the
district court indictment. He alleged that, in light of the municipal
court verdict, a district court prosecution for vehicular homicide
would violate constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.' 1
The district court denied Tanton's motion. The New Mexico Court
of Appeals granted an interlocutory appeal and reversed the district
court." 2 The court of appeals held that the vehicular homicide prosecution in district court was barred by the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy." The New Mexico Supreme Court granted
certiorari and, on review, held that the district court prosecution did
not violate the double jeopardy clauses of either the United States or
New Mexico Constitutions. 14
With its decision in State v. Tanton, the New*Mexico Supreme
Court established a two-tiered test for double jeopardy analysis. I
This note will discuss the supreme court's decision, the two-part
double jeopardy analysis established by the court, and the effect of
Tanton on future double jeopardy cases in New Mexico. In order to
better evaluate the future impact of this decision, this note will also
give a brief history of double jeopardy analysis in the United States
and New Mexico.

7. The actual charge was a violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. §66-8-101 (1978) (original
version at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-22-1 (1953)), which provides:
A. Homicide by vehicle is the killing of a human being in the unlawful operation of a motor vehicle.
B. Any person who commits homicide by vehicle while violating Section
66-8-102 or 66-8-113 NMSA 1978 is guilty of a felony.
8. N.M. Stat. Ann. §66-8-113 (1978) (original version at N.M. Stat. Ann. §64-22-3
(1953)) is the particular statute alleged to have been violated by the accused. This section in
pertinent part defines reckless driving.
9. N.M. Stat. Ann. §66-8-102 (Supp. 1979) (original version at N.M. Stat. Ann.
§64-22-2 (1953)) is the other statute alleged to have been violated by the accused. This
section, inter alia, prohibits the operation of a vehicle by a person under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.
10. 88 N.M. at 334 n.4, 540 P.2d at 814 n.4.
11. Id. at 334,540 P.2d at 814.
12. State v. Tanton, 88 N.M. 5, 536 P.2d 269 (1975).
13. Id.
14. State v. Tanton, 88 N.M. 333, 540 P.2d 813 (1975).
15. See text accompanying notes 44-52 infra.
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY ANALYSIS
State and federal courts have used three major methods to analyze
double jeopardy problems. The three methods are the "same offense" analysis, the "lesser included offense" doctrine, and the
"collateral estoppel" doctrine.
The same offense analysis arises from language contained in the
fifth amendment, which specifies that no person should be subject to
prosecution more than once for the same offense.' 6 Two distinct
definitions of same offense have emerged. The earlier and more popular definition is the "same evidence" test.1 7 This test has been
stated by the New Mexico Supreme Court as "whether the facts
offered in support of one ....

[offense] would sustain a conviction

of the other." 1 8 If the same facts would sustain a conviction of the
defendant in two separate trials, the second trial is barred by the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
The "same transaction" test is the other means by which same
offense is defined.1 9 This test has also been applied by the New
Mexico Supreme Court.2 0 Where "the several offenses are the same,
as where they arise out of the same transaction, and were committed
at the same time, and were part of a continuous criminal act, ...
they are susceptible of only one punishment."' I If several separate
crimes are committed as part of one criminal act, the same transaction test requires that all such crimes be tried together to prevent
an infringement of double jeopardy protection.
The doctrine of lesser included offenses is the second method used
by the courts to analyze double jeopardy questions. The New Mexico
Supreme Court has defined this test to mean that a conviction or
acquittal of a lesser offense necessarily included in a greater offense
bars a subsequent prosecution for the greater offense. 2 2 The doctrine of lesser included offenses prevents prosecutors from making
"trial runs" by prosecuting lesser offenses first, thereby perfecting
the case for prosecution of the greater offense in a subsequent
trial. 2 3
16. U.S. Const. amend. V;see N.M. Const. art. 2, §15.
17. Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L.J. 262, 269-70 (1965).
18. Owens v. Abram, 58 N.M. 682, 684, 274 P.2d 630, 631 (1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 917 (1955).
19. Supra note 17, at 275-76.
20. State v. Quintana, 69 N.M. 51, 364 P.2d 120 (1961).
21. Id. at 57, 364 P.2d at 124.
22. Ex parte Williams, 58 N.M. 37, 265 P.2d 359 (1954).
23. Supra note 17, at 286-88. The doctrine of lesser included offenses must now be
considered in analyzing all double jeopardy questions because the United States Supreme
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The courts have adopted the collateral estoppel doctrine as the
third method by which to analyze double jeopardy problems. The
collateral estoppel doctrine emerged as a cornerstone in double jeopardy analysis when the United States Supreme Court held, in Ashe v.
Swenson,2 4 that collateral estoppel is a constitutional requirement
of double jeopardy protection. The doctrine must, therefore, be considered by courts when they are confronted with any double jeopardy question.
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Under the collateral estoppel doctrine, "when an issue of ultimate
fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that
issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future
law suit."'2 s The doctrine was originally borrowed by the federal

courts from civil law.2 6 It was not widely used by state courts,
however, until the United States Supreme Court's decision in Benton
v. Maryland.I I
In Benton v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that the fifth
amendment guarantee against double jeopardy is enforceable against
the states through the fourteenth amendment.2 8 Until that time,
states had been free to establish their own standards for double
jeopardy protection as long as the accused was not subjected to
"fundamental unfairness." 2 9 In Benton, the Court required states to
meet federal standards of double jeopardy protection in the
future.3 0
Court recently held, in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), that a doctrine of lesser
included offenses analysis is required by the fifth amendment double jeopardy protection.
See note 65 infra.
24. 397 U.S. 436 (1970). See text accompanying notes 28-29 infra.
25. Id. at 443.
26. Id.
27. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
28. The Court held that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the fifth amendment's
provision against double jeopardy. Id at 794.
29. This standard of "fundamental unfairness" was enunciated in Hoag v. New Jersey,
356 U.S. 464 (1958). In Hoag, the Court reviewed a claim that the petitioner had been
subjected to double jeopardy in terms of whether he was deprived of fourteenth amendment
due process. This was the standard of review for all claimed violations of double jeopardy
against the state until Benton v. Maryland, because fifth amendment double jeopardy was
not incorporated in the fourteenth amendment until Benton. If the state process could not
be said to be "fundamentally unfair" to the defendant, the process did not violate the
fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due process. 356 U.S. at 467.
30. Since the federal courts were already applying the collateral estoppel doctrine in
criminal cases, the state would have to utilize it. At the time Benton v. Maryland was
decided, however, collateral estoppel had not been declared a constitutional requirement of
the fifth amendment double jeopardy protection.
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A major problem remained after Benton. State courts were not
sure which tests should be applied to meet the federal standards for
double jeopardy protection. The United States Supreme Court resolved some of the confusion by holding, in Ashe v. Swenson, 3 that
the elements of the collateral estoppel doctrine must be met to
ensure compliance with the double jeopardy protection.2 State
courts no longer had discretion as to whether they would apply the
collateral estoppel doctrine. They were now required to apply the
doctrine as it was stated in Ashe, and were given some guidance in
deciding double jeopardy questions.
NEW MEXICO'S STRUGGLE WITH DOUBLE JEOPARDY ANALYSIS
The New Mexico Supreme Court had an opportunity to apply the
collateral estoppel doctrine in State v. Tijerina.3 3 The court concluded that the only test adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Ashe for analyzing double jeopardy questions was the collateral estoppel doctrine. 3 4 This test was one "that looked to all the
relevant matters of the trial, and sought to determine whether or not
the jury, in reaching its verdict in the first trial, necessarily or actually determined the same issues which the State attempts to raise
in the second trial."' 35 Although the New Mexico Supreme Court
stated that it would utilize the collateral estoppel standard set out in
Ashe, 3 6 application of the standard proved to be troublesome.
Confusion over the application of the Ashe standard to multiple
prosecutions of a defendant arising out of a single incident became
31. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
32. The Court held, "The ultimate question to be determined, then, in the light of
Benton v. Maryland, . . . is whether (collateral estoppel] is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. We do not hesitate to hold that it is. For whatever
else that constitutional guarantee may embrace, . . . it surely protects a man who has been
acquitted from having to 'run the gantlet' a second time." 397 U.S. at 445-46 (footnote
omitted). See also State v. Tanton, 88 N.M. 5, 536 P.2d 269 (1975).
33. 86 N.M. 31, 519 P.2d 127 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 956 (1974). In his first
trial, defendant Tijerina was acquitted of charges which included (1) kidnapping a deputy
sheriff, (2) false imprisonment of that deputy, and (3) assault on the Rio Arriba County
Courthouse and jail. In the second trial, Tijerina was convicted of assault with intent to
commit a violent felony (to kill or commit mayhem) and false imprisonment of another
person. A violation of double jeopardy did not arise because Tijerina did not use an alibi
defense and "when the jury acquitted Tijerina of all three charges [in the first trial], it did
not necessarily conclude that he was not present at the jail that day, and thus did not
commit any crimes. The jury simply concluded that he was not guilty of the crimes
alleged."Id. at 34, 519 P.2d at 130.
34. Id. at 33, 519 P.2d at 129.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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apparent in State v. Maestas,s I decided by the court of appeals
shortly after State v. Tijerina. In Maestas, the defendant was arrested
and charged with unlawful possession of heroin and marijuana. He
was convicted of unlawful possession of marijuana in magistrate
court and was subsequently convicted of unlawful possession of
heroin in district court. The defendant claimed that the subsequent
conviction placed him in double jeopardy. The New Mexico Court of
Appeals cited State v. Tijerina as the controlling authority on the
double jeopardy claim, holding that the same evidence and same
transaction tests had been abandoned in that case." 8 The court concluded that the collateral estoppel doctrine was to be used in lieu of
the same evidence or same transaction test. 3 9 The court stated that
in applying the collateral estoppel doctrine it would look to
"whether the conviction in the first trial, necessarily or actually
determined the same issues which the state raised in the second
trial." 4 After applying the collateral estoppel doctrine to the facts of
the case in Maestas, the court of appeals held that the issues presented in the first trial were the same as would be raised in the
second trial. Therefore, the second prosecution was held to be
barred.4 '
Foreshadowing later New Mexico case law, Chief Judge Wood dissented in Maestas on the ground that the collateral estoppel doctrine
had been incorrectly applied. 4 2 He believed that the collateral estoppel standard would not bar a second prosecution in that case. He also
advocated the use of other tests when collateral estoppel would not
operate to bar a subsequent prosecution. One test he advocated was
the same evidence test.4"
37. 87 N.M. 6, 528 P.2d 650 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 5, 528 P.2d 649 (1974).
In this case the defendant was arrested for illegal possession of heroin and marijuana on
November 21, 1972. On December 7, 1972, a grand jury indictment was filed charging the
defendant with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, heroin. On April 17, 1973,
the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment because on January 24, 1973, he had been
convicted of unlawful possession of less than one ounce of marijuana.
38. It is clear from a reading of the case that the court of appeals relied on language in
State v. Tijerina which said, "Therefore, the test proposed in Ashe v.Swenson ... will be
utilized by this Court .... 86 N.M. at 33, 519 P.2d at 129.
39. 87 N.M. at 8, 528 P.2d at 652.
40. Id
41. Id at 10, 528 P.2d at 654.
42. Id (Wood, J., dissenting).
43. Id In reaching this decision, the Chief Judge discussed several New Mexico cases
which applied the same transaction test. Concluding that, with exception of State v. Anaya,
83 N.M. 672, 495 P.2d 1388 (Ct. App. 1972), the cases that applied that test limited it to
necessarily included offenses. A necessarily included offense is one in which two offenses
are involved, but proof of the lesser offense is necessary to proof of the greater offense.
The defendant in Maestas petitioned the New Mexico Supreme Court for a writ of
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One year later, Chief Judge Wood wrote the majority opinion for
the court of appeals in State v. Tanton (Tanton J).44 After considering each test that has been used to analyze double jeopardy questions, and applying each test to the specific facts of Tanton, the
court held that the prosecution in the second trial would not be
barred under any of those tests. The second prosecution was, however, barred by the courts' policy against piecemeal prosecutions. 4
THE NEW MEXICO SUPREME COURT DECISION IN
STATE v. TANTON (TANTON II)

In the process of making its decision in State v. Tanton (Tanton
1i),46 the New Mexico Supreme Court set out the methods by which
New Mexico courts should analyze double jeopardy questions. The
supreme court held that both the constitutionally-required doctrine
of collateral estoppel and the doctrine of lesser included offenses
must be considered at the outset of any double jeopardy analysis. 4
The court held that collateral estoppel is a constitutional defense
which can be raised by a defendant in a second trial only after an
acquittal in the first trial on the same issue.4 S On the facts of the
case, the court held that collateral estoppel was not applicable in
Tanton because the defendant was convicted in municipal court. 4 9
Therefore, collateral estoppel was not available to Tanton as a defense.
The court also discussed the doctrine of lesser included offenses. It
stated that "a conviction or acquittal of a lesser offense necessarily
included in a greater offense bars a subsequent prosecution for the
greater offense." ' ' The court held that the doctrine of lesser incertiorari,but certiorariwas denied. Since less than a year later State v. Tanton, 88 N.M.
333, 540 P.2d 813 (1975), expressly overruled Maestas, it is unclear why certiorari was
denied.
44. 88 N.M. 5, 536 P.2d 269 (1975).
45. 88 N.M. at 10, 536 P.2d at 274. The court specifically held that collateral estoppel,
the same evidence test, the lesser included offense doctrine and the merger of offenses
doctrine, when applied, would not bar the second trial for vehicular homicide. The court did
not apply the same transaction test because of the difficulties in defining "act" or "transaction." It seems clear that if the court had applied the same transaction test, the second
trial would have been barred because all charges against Tanton arose from one transaction,
namely, hitting and killing a young girl with his car. Indeed, the New Mexico Supreme Court
assumed that the trial court was correct in holding that the charges were all based on the
same occurrence.
46. 88 N.M. 333, 540 P.2d 813 (1975).
47. Id. at 335, 540 P.2d at 815.
48. Id
49. Id
50. Id (emphasis added).
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cluded offenses would not bar the second trial in Tan ton. There was
no bar because the indictment to be used in the second trial charged
Tanton with vehicular homicide while driving recklessly, or alternatively, vehicular homicide while driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 5 1 The court reasoned that the lesser offense of driving
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is not necessarily
included in the greater offense of homicide by vehicle due to reckless
driving.5 2
The court also held that if neither the collateral estoppel doctrine
nor the doctrine of lesser included offenses applies, then the same
offense analysis must be used.5I The court indicated that the same
evidence test rather than the same transaction test should be applied
to determine whether the defendant is being tried twice for the same
offense. 5" After applying the same evidence test to the facts in
Tanton, the court concluded that the defendant was not being tried
twice for the same offense, because "the facts offered in municipal
court to support a conviction for driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquors would not necessarily sustain a conviction for
homicide by vehicle in district court."' '
The supreme court also reviewed the holding of State v. Maestas,
where the court of appeals had concluded that the same evidence test
and the same transaction test had been abandoned. 5 6 In Tanton A,
the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the same evidence test had
not been abandoned and that it should have been applied in State v.
Maestas.1 7 On this issue, the court expressly overruled State v. Maestas.5 8 The supreme court agreed with the court of appeals' rejection
of the same transaction test. Since neither test had been held to be
constitutionally-required, the court concluded that the same transaction test "has little or nothing to recommend it over the same
51. If the charge had not been in the alternative, the conviction in municipal court for
driving under the influence of alcohol would have barred prosecution for vehicular homicide
due to reckless driving.
52. 88 N.M. at 335, 540 P.2d at 815.
53. Id.
54. In reaching this conclusion, the court said, "The generally accepted rule and the one
which we approve and apply today is the 'same evidence' test which was first stated in New
Mexico as 'whether the facts offered in support of one [offense] , would sustain a conviction
of the other.' Owens v. Abram, 58 N.M. 682, 274 P.2d 630 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
917 (1955) ....
55. 88 N.M. at 335, 540 P.2d at 815.
56. Id The New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the same evidence and same transaction tests had been abandoned by the United States Supreme Court in Ashe v. Swenson.
State v. Maestas, 87 N.M. at 8, 528 P.2d at 652.
57. 88 N.M. at 335, 540 P.2d at 815.
58. Id.
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evidence test, and in practice
it is so vague and obscure as to be far
'
more difficult to apply." 9
In Tan ton II, the supreme court reversed Tan ton I saying that the
prohibition against piecemeal prosecutions was merely a judicial policy, not a rule of law. Although the court stated that it adhered to
this policy, it nevertheless refused to apply it to bar the district court

prosecution. It can be inferred from the court's opinion that it felt
Tanton 0 was not a proper case in which to apply this judicial
6
policy.
After Tanton II, New Mexico has a two-tiered double jeopardy
analysis. The first consideration in any double jeopardy challenge is
whether the constitutionally-required doctrine of collateral estoppel
and the doctrine of lesser included offenses apply. 6 1 If neither of
these doctrines apply to the facts of the case under consideration,

then the same evidence test must be applied to determine if the
defendant is being tried twice for the same offense. 6 2
THE IMPACT OF TANTON I
Ashe v. Swenson left unanswered the question of whether double
jeopardy protection exists when collateral estoppel does not bar a
subsequent prosecution. 6 3 In Tanton I, the New Mexico Supreme

Court answered the question affirmatively by holding that the doctrine of lesser included offenses must also be considered. 6 ' The
65
United States Supreme Court has since held, in Brown v. Ohio,
59. Id. at 336, 540 P.2d at 816. The court went on to agree with Chief Judge Wood in
his dissenting opinion in State v. Maestas, that all of the New Mexico cases, except State v.
Anaya, 83 N.M. 672, 495 P.2d 1388 (Ct. App. 1972), which applied the same transaction
test, were cases involving lesser and necessarily included offenses in the first trial, which
would bar a second prosecution anyway. State v. Anaya was expressly overruled insofar as it
applied the same transaction test.
60. The supreme court cited State v. Goodson, 54 N.M. 184, 217 P.2d 262 (1950) as an
example of when this judicial policy should not apply. The court did not, however, cite an
example of a case where the judicial policy should apply.
61. Since in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held
the concept of lesser included offenses to be a constitutional requirement of the double
jeopardy protection, both this concept and collateral estoppel are constitutionally-required.
Therefore, these tests must always be made at the onset of all courts' considerations of
double jeopardy questions.
62. 88 N.M. at 335, 540 P.2d at 815.
63. State v. Maestas, 87 N.M. 6, 528 P.2d 650 (Ct. App. 1974), contains an example of
such an interpretative problem. There, the New Mexico Court of Appeals interpreted the
Ashe collateral estoppel doctrine as replacing the same evidence and same transaction tests.
In Maestas, the court of appeals held that the collateral estoppel doctrine was to be applied
instead of these tests and the court therefore refused to consider them.
64. 88 N.M. at 335, 540 P.2d at 815.
65. 432 U.S. 161 (1977). The Supreme Court stated, "Whatever the sequence may be,
the Fifth Amendment forbids successive and cumulative punishment for a greater and lesser
included offense." Id. at 169.
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that the doctrine of lesser included offenses is also a constitutional
requirement of double jeopardy protection. 6 6 Therefore, courts must
now consider that doctrine in addition to the collateral estoppel
doctrine when confronted with a double jeopardy question.
In Tanton II, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the same
evidence test must be applied to determine whether the defendant is
being tried twice for the same offense if neither the collateral estoppel doctrine nor the doctrine of lesser included offenses bars a subsequent prosecution. 6 7 Since the United States Supreme Court has not
held that the same offense analysis is required in double jeopardy
cases by the fifth amendment, it is not clear whether courts outside
New Mexico must make that analysis when considering double jeopardy questions.
The same evidence test virtually annuls the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. 6 8 The danger of using the same evidence test in double jeopardy analysis can be seen where a single
criminal act involves several victims. Under the same evidence test, a
separate prosecution may be brought for each victim because different evidence as to each victim will be required in each case.
It is difficult to imagine a situation in which the same evidence
test will bar a subsequent prosecution except when the same defendant is charged with the same violation of the same statute against
the same victim.6" For example, when a person is charged with
unlawful possession of the controlled substances of heroin and marijuana, the evidence required to prove unlawful possession of heroin is
different from that required to prove unlawful possession of marijuana. The difference in proof is in proving possession of marijuana
rather than possession of heroin. If the doctrine of collateral estoppel
or lesser included offenses does not apply, the accused could be
prosecuted as many times as there are charges of unlawful possession
of different controlled substances. This would subject the defendant
to unnecessary prosecutorial harassment-the very conduct the
double jeopardy clause seeks to prevent. 7 It is difficult to see how
66. The purpose of holding a test or doctrine to be "constitutionally-required" is to
assure that each defendant is offered the same protection. Determining what the United
States Constitution requires is a matter of constitutional interpretations of the protections
afforded.
67. 88 N.M. at 335, 540 P.2d at 815.
68. 397 U.S. at 451 (Brennan, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Brennan was joined in his
concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall. Mr. Justice Douglas is
no longer on the Court, but Justices Brennan and Marshall continue to support the same
transaction test.
69. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 451 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
70. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1955).
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this policy is served by the same evidence test, even if this test is
applied in addition to the collateral estoppel doctrine and the doctrine of lesser included offenses. 7'
Two shortcomings exist in the application of the collateral estoppel doctrine to double jeopardy questions: it will not bar a subsequent prosecution where any issue not raised in the first trial is
presented in the second trial, and it will not bar a subsequent prosecution when the first trial ends in a verdict of guilty."2 The concept
of lesser included offenses is too narrow to provide adequate protection, since it bars second prosecutions only where they necessarily
include proof required for conviction of a lesser offense for which
the defendant has already been tried. 7
The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy should
embody the collateral estoppel doctrine and the doctrine of lesser
included offenses, and it should also include the same transaction
test as a constitutionally-required means of defining same offense.
The same transaction test provides the maximum protection against
multiple prosecutions by requiring that all criminal charges against a
defendant which arise out of one criminal transaction be brought at
one trial. 7 4 Justice Brennan agrees with this position. He has stated,
"[C]orrection of the abuse of criminal process should not in any
event be made to depend on the availability of collateral estoppel
....

That evil will be most effectively avoided, and the Clause can

thus best serve its worthy ends, if 'same offence' is construed to
embody the 'same transaction' standard." 7
The principal shortcoming of the same transaction test is in defining the word "transaction." 7"6 The utility of the test depends on
how clearly the term "same transaction" is defined. The definition of
"transaction" should, however, follow logically from the goals underlying the policy of prohibiting multiple prosecutions. 77 "Trans71. See Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L.J. 262 (1965). The commentator states,
"[A] s we shall see, none of the [same evidence] tests is adequate to implement the basic
policies of double jeopardy. Bishop aptly describes the same evidence approach as one
'which, if fully adopted, could render practically void the constitutional inhibition.' 1
Bishop, Criminal Law § 1048 (9th ed. 1923) .... " Id at 275.
72. 397 U.S. at 459 & n.13 (Brennan, J., concurring).
73. See generally Ex parte Williams, 58 N.M. 37, 265 P.2d 359 (1954).
74. 397 U.S. at 453 n.7 (Brennan, J., concurring). The same transaction test would allow
for exceptions to mandatory joinder of all crimes which arise out of the same transaction.
One exception would allow a separate trial where a crime is not completed or discovered
until after the commencement of a prosecution for other crimes arising out of the same
transaction. Another exception is where joinder would be prejudicial to either the prosecution or defense.
75. 397 U.S. at 459-60 (Brennan, J., concurring).
76. Twice in Jeopardy,supra at 276.
77. Id at 277 & n.70.
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action" should be defined to prohibit only those multiple prosecutions which the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy
was intended to prohibit, namely those which subject a defendant to
undue harrassment and compel him to live in a state of continuing
anxiety. 8 Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure deals
effectively with this problem by making compulsory all counterclaims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence from which
the plaintiff's claim arose.7 9 Surely such a definition of same transaction could be successful in criminal cases as well.
CONCLUSION
In State v. Tanton, the New Mexico Supreme Court established a
two-tiered test for double jeopardy analysis. The court held that the
first inquiry to be made is whether the constitutionally-required doctrines of collateral estoppel or lesser included offenses prohibit a
second prosecution of the same defendant. If neither of these doctrines bars a second prosecution, the court must apply the same
evidence test to determine whether the defendant is being tried twice
for the same offense. The underlying fifth amendment policy protecting defendants from exposure to double jeopardy would, however, be best served if same offense is defined by use of the same
transaction test.
J. RANDY TURNER

78. 355 U.S. at 187.
79. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 states: "A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim... the
pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim ....

